# PoC from Forward DNS dataset
# This data is created by extracting domain names from a number of sources and then sending DNS queries for each domain.
https://opendata.rapid7.com/sonar.fdns_v2/
cat CNAME-DATASET-NAME | pigz -dc | grep -E "\.azurewebsites\.com"
cat CNAME-DATASET-NAME | pigz -dc | grep -E "\.s3\.amazonaws\.com"
• First step should be to determine what services are in use
• More and more orgs are moving assets to the cloud one at a time
• Many have limited deployment to cloud providers, but some have fully embraced the cloud and are using it for AD, production assets, security products, and more
• Determine things like AD connectivity, mail gateways, web apps, file storage, etc.
• Traditional host discovery still applies
• After host discovery resolve all names, then perform whois
lookups to determine where they are hosted
• Microsoft, Amazon, Google IP space usually indicates cloud service usage
◇ More later on getting netblock information for each cloud service
• MX records can show cloud-hosted mail providers
• Certificate Transparency (crt.sh)
• Monitors and logs digital certs
• Creates a public, searchable log
• Can help discover additional subdomains
• More importantly… you can potentially find more Top Level Domains (TLD’s)!
• Single cert can be scoped for multiple domains
• Search (Google, Bing, Baidu, DuckDuckGo): site:targetdomain.com -site:www.targetdomain.com
• Shodan.io and Censys.io zoomeye.org
• Internet-wide portscans
• Performs lookups on a list of potential subdomains
• Make sure to use quality lists
• SecLists: https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/tree/master/Discovery/DNS
• MX Records can help us identify cloud services in use
◇ O365 = target-domain.mail.protection.outlook.com
◇ G-Suite = google.com | googlemail.com
◇ Proofpoint = pphosted.com
• If you find commonalities between subdomains try iterating names
◇ HackerTarget https://hackertarget.com/
◇ ThreatCrowd https://www.threatcrowd.org/
◇ DNSDumpster https://dnsdumpster.com/
◇ ARIN Searches https://whois.arin.net/ui/
▪ Search bar accepts wild cards “*”
▪ Great for finding other netblocks owned by the same organization
▪ Public: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=56519
▪ US Gov: http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=57063
▪ Germany: http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=57064
▪ China: http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=57062
◇ https://ip-ranges.amazonaws.com/ip-ranges.json
◇ Google made it complicated so there’s a script on the next page to get the current IP netblocks.
◇ Look for any login portals
▪ https://companyname.account.box.com
◇ Can find cached Box account data too
◇ PowerMeta https://github.com/dafthack/PowerMeta
◇ FOCA https://github.com/ElevenPaths/FOCA
• Recon-NG https://github.com/lanmaster53/recon-ng
• OWASP Amass https://github.com/OWASP/Amass
• Spiderfoot https://www.spiderfoot.net/
• Gobuster https://github.com/OJ/gobuster
• Sublist3r https://github.com/aboul3la/Sublist3r
• Find ssh keys in shhgit.darkport.co.uk https://github.com/eth0izzle/shhgit
• GitLeaks https://github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks
• Gitrob https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob
• Truffle Hog https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog
◇ Trying one password for every user at an org to avoid account lockouts (Spring2020)
• Most systems have some sort of lockout policy
◇ Example: 5 attempts in 30 mins = lockout
• If we attempt to auth as each individual username one time every 30 mins we lockout nobody
◇ Using previously breached credentials to attempt to exploit password reuse on corporate accounts
• People tend to reuse passwords for multiple sites including corporate accounts
• Various breaches end up publicly posted
• Search these and try out creds
• Out-of-date web technologies with known vulns
• SQL or command injection vulns
• Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
• Good place to start post-shell:
• Creds in the Metadata Service
• Reused access certs as private keys on web servers
◇ Extract certificate with Mimikatz
◇ Use it to authenticate to Azure
• Mimikatz can export “non-exportable” certificates:
mimikatz# privilege::debug
mimikatz# crypto::certificates /systemstore:local_machine /store:my /export
• Phishing is still the #1 method of compromise
• Target Cloud engineers, Developers, DevOps, etc.
• Two primary phishing techniques:
◇ Cred harvesting / session hijacking
◇ Remote workstation compromise w/ C2
• Attack designed to steal creds and/or session cookies
• Can be useful when security protections prevent getting shells
• Email a link to a target employee pointing to cloned auth portal
◇ Examples: Microsoft Online (O365, Azure, etc.), G-Suite, AWS Console
• They auth and get real session cookies… we get them too.
• Phish to compromise a user’s workstation
• Enables many other options for gaining access to cloud resources
• Steal access tokens from disk
• Web Config and App Config files
◇ Commonly found on pentests to include cleartext creds
◇ WebApps often need read/write access to cloud storage or DBs
◇ Web.config and app.config files might contain creds or access tokens
◇ Look for management cert and extract to pfx like publishsettings files
◇ Often found in root folder of webapp
• Internal Code Repositories
▪ A. Portscan internal web services (80, 443, etc.) then use EyeWitness to screenshot each service to quickly analyze
▪ B. Query AD for all hostnames, look for subdomains git, code, repo, bitbucket, gitlab, etc..
◇ Can use automated tools (gitleaks, trufflehog, gitrob) or use built-in search features
▪ Search for AccessKey, AKIA, id_rsa, credentials, secret, password, and token
• The commands ran previously may indicate where to look
• Sometimes creds get passed to the command line
• Linux hosts command history is here:
• PowerShell command history is here:
◇ %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
• Who do we have access as?
• What can we access (webapps, storage, etc.?)
• How are we going to escalate to admin?
• Any security protections in place (ATP, GuardDuty, etc.)?
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/*
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/*
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/*
http://127.0.0.1:2375/v1.24/containers/json
http://127.0.0.1:2379/v2/keys/?recursive=true
http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/*
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/*